PRAISE

»The far-reaching transnational perspective over five countries (and at times even more) with truly deep-probing archival research – in addition to the tremendous amount of printed sources, 27 archives in six countries were scoured – is spectacular. Overall, Bodo Mrozek has presented an extraordinary scholarly achievement that depicts the emergence of international pop culture in previously unseen breadth, embedded in wide-reaching lines of development, and analysed with a diverse, up to date theoretical arsenal. From my perspective, we have a milestone work of pop history that demonstrates the great analytical potential of the combination of approaches from sound studies, visual history, body history, and other approaches. In addition, the author continuously opens up new perspectives and writes so brilliantly, making reading an invigorating pleasure.«

Detlef Siegfried, Historian at Copenhagen University

»[...] this impressive overview makes clear how pop culture historically reached an emergent level, in other words how an entire concert crystallised from out of a mess of disordered and disparate phenomena, a culture that cannot be ignored.«

Steffen Martus, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

»What do Vidal Sassoon’s ›Five Point Cut‹, ducktails and Beatle’s haircuts, beard bans [...] say about the state of a society? A whole lot, or in any event they do as far as Bodo Mrozek’s congenial, incredibly nerd-like 800-page-volume Youth, Rock and Riots is concerned. A transnational history that establishes a new standard for the interpretation of music- and youth-culture as social history [...]«

Die literarische Welt

»[Mrozek] tapped into an overwhelming number of sources [...] and in a detailed, systematic, conceptually precise, but also delightfully entertaining, way reports on the founding years of pop and all the related conflicts and struggles.«

Jens Balzer, DIE ZEIT
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3.4. The Hour of the Experts

In 1957, the New York journalist Harrison E. Salisbury set out on a journey that he would later call the most important one of his career. It cost 15 Cents and took no more than an hour. The experienced war correspondent took the underground train from Manhattan to Brooklyn, where he wanted to explore a conflict area located only a few kilometres from his own flat: the living environment of teenagers in an urban »deprived area«. His travel account, first published as a series of reportages in *The New York Times* and later as a popular non-fiction book, found remarkable resonance.\(^1\) Even though he was travelling within his own country, the former Moscow correspondent established a connection between his explorations and the global-political conflict of his times: »The teenage problem and the Russian problem – there was, I assumed, a connection between the two major issues of our times that was considerably bigger than most people could imagine.«\(^2\) According to the author, the competition with the Soviet Union, in which the USA had recently – in the so-called »Sputnik crisis« – suffered a critical loss, required the youth as a resource in order to compensate for the Soviet Union’s technological and military advantage, which had manifested itself dramatically in space, with well-trained forces. This increased the importance of security policy at the »front« where teachers, police officers and social workers were fighting in the interior. How, Salisbury asked rhetorically, could America withstand the foreign threat when a conflict was raging within the country itself that it was unable to solve?

Salisbury’s voice was definitely heard, but for a long time it had no longer just been the accounts of the reporters, sometimes sensationalist, sometimes empathetic, that set the tone in the debates. The posited potential threat that arose over the course of the discussion of the supposedly increasing »delinquency« as well as in the aftermath of the cinema and concert riots virtually demanded a scientific approach. This desire was intensified additionally by the media attention that the individual cases, which had advanced to the position of an emblematic typology of perpetrators, had caused. The increasing pressure from the public on policymakers therefore brought another authority to the scene: the expert.

In the differentiating media and information society, the expert had risen to an authority from whom people expected to be provided information about »how the social and economic life in a modern society could be improved.«\(^3\) With the mass media, esoteric expert knowledge became widely available in the 20\(^{th}\) century, it determined everyday perceptions and played an important role in the formation of a »public opinion«.\(^4\) In the middle of the century, the professional experts were no longer striving for mere expertise in narrowly defined specialities; instead, they were now concerned with »securing their competence for the description of society or newly establishing it.«\(^5\) They now considered it their task to collect data that was expected

\(^{1}\) The reports were partially printed on the title page. Cf. Harrison E. Salisbury, »Youth Gang Members Tell of Lives, Hates and Fears«, in: *NYT* (25. 03. 1958), p. 1. That is why the book was advertised as »The Headline-Making Book« on the cover.


to help answer the most pressing open questions. Experts, however, also played an important role in putting problems in a transnational perspective since, as members of educational elites, they had knowledge of foreign languages, access to foreign sources of knowledge and were part of a transnational network.

Towards the end of the fifties, the increased attention on part of the media and politics, caused by mass conflicts and scandalised individual cases, caused a condensation of discourses that generated new information about the connections between youth, culture, living environments and social behaviour. Academics who were actively involved in university research generally acted as experts. But non-university researchers – journalists like Salisbury and agents from practice, among them judges, teachers or streetworkers – piped up as well. Jürgen Link differentiates between three types of discourse to which the different expert statements analysed in this chapter can be ascribed respectively: Firstly, there are elementary discourses that express normality in stereotypical statements about deviant behaviour; secondly, there are specialist discourses that provide »specific knowledge for a specialist audience«, and thirdly, there are intermediary discourses that mediate between the two types, for example by translating specialist discourses for a generally educated public. Intermediary discourses overlap with the »elementary« everyday knowledge but strive for »terminological differentiation« at the same time. Influential popular scientific books as well as documentaries and reportages can be considered intermediary discourses.

Contemporary youth and pop culture in particular, which did not belong to those traditional fields of research that promised social prestige to the educated middle-class elites in the fifties and sixties and that therefore received little attention from academics, initially became the field studied by freelance authors. They were indeed heard and were – provided they had acquired specialised knowledge about the matter at hand – deemed authentic due to their experience, particularly as they knew how to market their expertise cleverly. The status of being an expert was generally established by publishing a book. Salisbury’s book received significant attention, several reprints and was also translated into German. Even though in it he asserts a dramatic increase of delinquency among teenagers, the New York Times journalist does not appear as a proponent of severe restrictions. Rather, he describes encounters with »real« teenagers who feel like they are part of a group themselves or had come into conflict with the police. He criticises the creation of new urban »ghettos« as part of city planning measures and agrees with the narrative of the »broken families« that explains the reasons of delinquency with the crisis of the nuclear family as the core of the middle classes: »A child who is cared for
not become a shook-up.«12 Salisbury directs biting criticism at New York’s chief of police, who had fought against the putative transformation of police officers into social workers because he believed that socio-therapeutic tasks were better suited to other institutions. With his book, Salisbury positioned himself as one of those cold war liberals, who seemed moderate and reformist as far as domestic policy was concerned but rallied behind anti-communism as the priority of foreign affairs.13

Yet in his text, Salisbury also holds pop-cultural products responsible for the development of delinquency, among them »cheap tabloids, salacious magazines and brutal comic books«, interspersed with »pictures of beautiful girls and handsome men dressed in a manner hardly becoming of the Garden of Eden«.14 In his description of the »shook-up kids« he mentions that the members of street gangs not only consumed late-night horror movies but also the rock ‘n’ roll television show presented by Dick Clark. He also names a radio station whose DJ had regularly saluted street gangs.15 But the title of his book establishes the connection between rock ‘n’ roll and delinquency in a particularly bold manner. The Shook-Up Generation implicitly invokes the Elvis song All Shook Up, incredibly popular in the year the book was first published – a love song that is appropriated as a label for juvenile delinquency on the cover of the book and thus once more equates conflict behaviour with a controversial musical phenomenon.16 By using the term »generation«, the title suggests that Salisbury’s local observations in Brooklyn were transferrable to the entire American youth, maybe even beyond that. A minority group within a specific urban setting thus became »a problem that concerns us all«, as many articles in the fifties concurred in many different countries.17

In these expert diagnoses, the youth was constructed as a societal unit that demanded intervention, but only after initial analysis and close examination. But in order to do so, different teenagers first had to be put into groups and individual behaviours had to be systematised into patterns and typologies. Because by now the topic of youth had been constituted as an urgent problem of the times, studies pursuing this endeavour promised attention beyond the scope of science in media and politics and, not least of all, profits on the book market. Demographic findings, according to which the group of young people would have greater influence on future societies due to high birth rates, developed a particular potential for threat. By correlating prognoses based on age statistics with the claims on delinquency, forward projections predicted a dark future. Since the share of delinquent teenagers had been growing exponentially for years, the percentage of criminals among the overall population would – according to the pessimistic hypothesis – also grow exponentially as the youth grew older.

With his book 1,000,000 Juvenile Delinquents, the journalist Benjamin Fine took the same line in 1955. His downright dystopian predictions that assumed a doubling of crime rates by 1960 encouraged a biologicist view on social problems and imagined crime as a social

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12 Salisbury, The Shook-up Generation, p. 166.
13 On the cold war liberals Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels, p. 110-123.
16 Presley, Elvis with The Jordanaires, »All Shook Up« / »That’s When Your Heartaches Begin« (1957/3), RCA 47-6870 [45].
disease of virtually pandemic proportions. The socio-psychological foundations of these
prognoses include the controversial studies conducted by a Mr and Mrs Glueck, based on simple
behaviourism, according to which juvenile »delinquents« would become criminals in their adult
life quasi automatically. By interpreting delinquency as a predetermined personality trait and
social »disease« within the scope of the recidivism paradigm, even less severe »deviant«
behaviour in adolescence could be taken as an early symptom of an infection that would break
out fully in adulthood and had the potential to not just infect individuals but the entire
population, which was conceived of as a collective entity, – with proportionately devastating
consequences. These figures of thought, controversial even at the time, created an urgent need
for causal-theoretical expertise on the one hand and pragmatic solution approaches based upon
that on the other. Numerous experts provided both things in one. The spectrum of the topics,
explanatory approaches and proposed solutions was conceivably broad. The following will
mainly be dedicated to discourses that deal with questions of pop culture. The expert discourse
shall not be reproduced but historically contextualised. As diverse as the approaches and
evaluations may be, most of them have in common that they consider the youth as a resource
for future societies and treat their cultural forms of expression in the present as an indication of
what is to come. Many of the expert reports on the state of the youth at the time were therefore
 – firstly – predictions of the future. Secondly, in many cases they served the personal interests
of the experts, who were competing for interpretational sovereignty and often economical
resources, and thirdly, the expert evaluations that appeared objectified were more closely
intertwined with fictional discourses from the world of cinema, music and literature as well as
with tabloid headlines than they would have liked people to believe. Before 1958, youth cultures
had caused no comparable fear of delinquency in France – and likewise Italy, for example – as
they had in the neighbouring countries. But when Marcel Carné’s Les Tricheurs was released
in 1958, a societal discussion not just about the film but also about the state of the French
youth started just in time for the film release. The widely circulated magazine L’Express, which
had initiated the debate on a generational nouvelle vague a few months prior, used the film as
an occasion for another special supplement that contained various reportages about the
problems of real adolescents under the headline »Who are the Tricheurs?«, which tied in
seamlessly with the discourses on the youth of other countries of which the French »tricheurs«
were now considered to be a part. A young Spanish migrant, for example, put his frustration on

\[\text{Cf. Benjamin Fine,} 1,000,000 \text{ Delinquents, London 1956, p. 26. Fine assumed a demographic increase among}
10- to 17-year-olds in the year 1960 and predicted 750,000 court cases and a total number of 2,250,000 criminal
acts. With that, he had multiplied the prognosis on an earlier book title: Sheldon Glueck, Eleanor Touroff Glueck,
One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents. Their Treatment by Court and Clinic, Cambridge, London 1934. Cf. on the
topic Mackert, Jugenddelinquenz, p. 27f.; Bodo Mrozek, »Panic on the Streets of London«, in: Ronald Gratz,
164, here: p. 159. A French title potentiated the motif once more in the sixties: Claude Dufrasne et al., Aspects de

\[\text{Cf. Glueck/Glueck,} One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents. At length on the topic cf. Mackert, Jugenddelinquenz,
\[\text{p. 63-64.}

\[\text{This is contrasted by, e.g., Tosco R. Fyvel, Insecure Offenders. Rebellious Youth in the Welfare State, London}

vous critiques . . . «, in: France Observateur (06. 11. 1958), p. 23. Also see above, chapter 3.2.3.}

\[\text{Cf. Francoise Giroud, Jean Cau, Marek Hlasko, Bill Hopkins, Miguel de Salabert, »Qui sont les Tricheurs?«, in:}
L’Express (Special issue), (16. 10. 1958), p. 13-25.} \]
record and underneath the photograph of a London »Teddy Boy« dancing the jive a British boy of the same age complained that the book-reading population was now turning against the new media of cinema, radio and television.\(^{23}\) That way, the debates on the youth of other countries were transferred onto France; it wasn’t just the *faits divers* of the daily newspapers but also pedagogical and humanistic journals that turned their attention to the topic immediately.\(^{24}\) Sure, the plot of Carné’s film was entirely fictional, but the director had claimed that his film had documentary character, since he had spent several months with the juvenile inspirations for his characters in the milieu of Paris’ Saint-Germain-des-Prés (known for its *caves de jazz*) for research purposes.\(^{25}\) Other filmmakers had also made use of this topos – and their calculus seemed to work, for the contents of the films were discussed time and again just as scientific analyses of delinquency were cinematically dramatized.\(^{26}\) In Germany, too, film stills from US-American *young rebel movies* were used to illustrate articles about German teenagers.\(^{27}\) Many expert statements were situated in this web of fictional and scientific discourses that influenced the image of youth as well as the treatment of this new culture from which, in turn, new policies emerged.

[...]

5. Conclusion: The Rise of the Minorities


On April 15, 1966 the US-American news magazine *Time* was published with an unusual title page. Where normally the likenesses of statesmen and images of war zones would be displayed and where only a week before capital letters on a jet-black background had formed the question »Is God dead?«, a wimmelpicture by the artist Geoffrey Dickinson was now gathering all sorts of colourful objects and figures of British provenance: double-decker bus and discotheque, dinner jacket and bell-bottoms, Big Ben and men with long hair, Union Jack and paisley fabrics, Mini Cooper and mini skirt.\(^{28}\) The title story by journalist Piri Halasz provided the context for this cheerful eclecticism. These were, she wrote, the attributes of a cultural change that had replaced the traditional Britishness of the old Empire with a new, urban style: »LONDON: The Swinging City« is written on a banner at the upper edge of the image.\(^{29}\) (Fig. 98)

This slogan, which would soon set out on a remarkable career to become the label of the »Swinging Sixties«, marked a turning point in the debates on youth and pop culture, which had

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 22.


\(^{25}\) Cf. »Je n’ai rien invente: Un entretien avec Marcel Carne«, in: *Qui sont les Tricheurs?*, p. 17 f. Also see above, chapter 3.3.

\(^{26}\) Further examples include *Die Halbstarken and Rebel Without A Cause*, see above, chapter 3.2.3.

\(^{27}\) For example the film stills from *Rebel Without A Cause* in the *Hamburger Anzeiger*. Cf. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels*, p. 106.


mostly been conducted in a polemic and controversial manner since the middle of the 20th century. Halasz’ article dealt with London but formulated a comprehensive interpretative authority with a lot of self-confidence. Each era, the American journalist began her article, had its world capital. Just as Vienna had represented the age of the Waltz in the Habsburg empire, Berlin had represented the twenties, Paris the forties and Rome the *dolce vita* of the fifties, London had risen to the leading metropolis of a new era that could be called a »colorful and ebullient pop culture«.\(^{30}\)

This culture manifested itself in different places, institutions and people. A miniature map of the city situated it in London’s cityscape and thereby pursued the »topographic fixation« of a temporal phase formation.\(^{31}\) The enlarged section focusses on the boroughs of Soho, Kensington and Chelsea, but mainly on King’s Road and Carnaby Street.\(^{32}\) (Fig. 99) The map’s legend lists discotheques, boutiques, galleries, restaurants, theatres and casinos as landmarks on par with traditional landmarks such as the Royal Albert Hall.\(^{33}\) The protagonists of this new cultural scene presented in the text are fashion designers (Mary Quant), actors (Michael Caine) and directors (Michelangelo Antonioni). In addition, there were television producers, presenters

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\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 42.


\(^{33}\) Cf. Halasz, »Great Britain«, p. 41A.
and people from the advertising industry as well as photo reporters (David Bailey), hairstylists (Vidal Sassoon), art dealers (Robert Fraser) and boutique owners (John Stephen), all of whom where thus stylised as new intermediaries in a changing cultural field. The fact that something new was going on can be discerned even from these protagonists’ ages: Almost all of them were younger than 35, many of them only in their twenties. This also reflected the demographic developments in London, where thirty percent of the population at the time were between the ages of 15 and 34. Beyond that, a softening of the old class antagonisms could be observed, because many of the people named were from »the [...] lower middle class and even the working class« but they now formed an influential »swinging meritocracy.« This, the author concludes, proved the rise of two social groups: the youth and the members of the lower classes.  

Fig. 99: Topographic fixation of a cultural revolution: city map in Time (1966).

Halasz located the cultural roots of the shifts she purported in the formerly criminalised social figures and youth cultures, of all places. She explicitly invoked the »Teddy Boys« of the fifties and with reference to the conflicts between Mods and Rockers in South England in the early sixties she quotes Cathy McGowan, presenter of the show Ready, Steady, Go!, saying: »The war is over – the Mods have won.« The same youth fashions that had caused controversies only a few years prior were now not just decriminalised retrospectively but were, at the same time, upgraded to the origin myth of a youth and pop culture that was called specifically »British«. »Swinging London« as a term soon rose to fame. Design magazine, for example, speculated in the August of the same year that London’s Carnaby Street would one day be synonymous with a style on par with the German Bauhaus that would radiate beyond music and fashion to product design, because even furniture and cutlery design were already »swinging like the Supremes«.

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34 The latter in particular is nothing but an allegation, because the reportage provides no proof that the new creative stars weren’t mere individual cases but part of a broader trend.
35 Cf. Halasz, »Great Britain«, p. 41A.
36 Which was also due to the fact that at the same time, Halasz was working on a London travel guide, which she sold on the book market with great success only a brief while later: Piri Halasz, A Swinger’s Guide to London, London 1966.
Even though London was undoubtedly a landmark of this new culture, its rise was not limited to the city. Shortly before Halasz’ influential *Time* article was published, the competing magazine *Newsweek* appeared on the stands with a cover designed by Roy Lichtenstein that illustrated the explosion of pop in a way that is iconic today. The issue dealt with new trends in New York, whose creators were not part of the marketing departments of big corporations but teenagers, and as proof that an internationalised youth was in the making here too the German »half-strong ones« of the fifties were invoked.\(^3^9\) In 1966, the French magazine *Paris Match* dedicated numerous articles to the British capital, whose youth was cultivating an optimism about the future oblivious to history, but it also proclaimed Paris – outdated when it came to fashion according to *Time* – as an equal place within the new pop culture.\(^4^0\) The »terreur« of the Yé-yés« was ending and a new, internationalised style was taking their place.\(^4^1\) The French news magazine *L’Express* had apparently seen a »Europe of the stars«, which did have a capital in London but not its only one, come into being in February of that year: »This Europe of youth and beauty is ruled on the Rome-Paris-London axis.«\(^4^2\) A year before, the term *youthquake* had made it into American *Vogue*, and Françoise Giroud, who had coined the *nouvelle vague* as a generational term ten years prior in *L’Express*, also described in December 1966 an internationalised youth culture whose members demonstrated in Berlin, destroyed phone boxes in London, experimented with LSD in the USA and – like the Dutch Provos and French Beatniks – also established a new political style.\(^4^3\) The West-German magazine *Der Spiegel* used the term »pop culture« for the first time in April 1966 in an article on the »pop sex« that showed itself in dances like the Frug or the Monkey and used it to denote a conglomeration of pop art, beat, happenings and the fashionable Courrège-look that was flooding the Western world.\(^4^4\)

As fuzzy as these kinds of trend prognoses are by their very nature and as much as they obey the short economic cycles of the topic production of mass media: What’s remarkable is that the thesis of the formation of a new pop culture was now no longer formulated in specialised youth or music media but had arrived in news magazines and cultural journals for adults with mass circulation – and therefore in the publishing mainstream.\(^4^5\) Unlike in the years before, pop culture was not exoticized as a manifestation of cultural deviance or even declared a social pathology in these articles; it was now presented as an urban lifestyle phenomenon of transnational reach. This shift within the discursive fight for interpretative authority that had lasted for decades didn’t happen in 1966 per se,\(^4^6\) instead, it had emerged over the course of a


few years: Tom Wolfe had already noticed the appearance of the term »pop society« in the USA in 1963,47 while American commodity aesthetics had already been discussed in the British Independent Group, a circle formed around the artist Richard Hamilton, in the first half of the 1950s at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, and here and there American radio programmes added the term »pop« to their names as early as the 1930s.48 The wave of articles in 1966, however, undoubtedly posed an attention-economical climax for the new phenomenon. When the young West-German novelist Hubert Fichte recited from his manuscript The Palette, unpublished at the time, to the beat of the British Mod band Ian and the Zombies (well known from the Brighton rumbles) in Hamburg’s Star-Club in October, the DIE ZEIT critic pondered the sudden compatibility of two formerly separated cultural spheres:

Here, in the »Village of the holy Sanctus Paulus«, the beat didn’t overwhelm the prose; the two coexisted, rather: they joined forces, they discounted the alleged schism between the sub-, the pop-culture that has its fashion and its manners and the serious, the higher, the »actual« culture clad in dark colours.49

Even academics were increasingly addressing this change now. As early as 1964, Susan Sontag in New York had noted in her »Notes on Camp« that »post-rock ‘n’ roll, which the French call yé-yé« was also canonised ironically, whereby the high took its place next to the low.50 And in order to lend scientific credence to her thesis of cultural change, Piri Halasz quoted the British cultural scientist Richard Hoggart in her famous Time article: »A new group of people is emerging into society and creates a kind of classlessness and a verve that has not been seen before.«51 Beyond that, she regarded Hoggart himself as living proof for the transformation she purported, because he, the »orphan from the slums of Leeds«, had managed to rise to the country’s educational elite, which she called a »swinging meritocracy«. Hoggart had previously shaped the debate on popular culture and had founded the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in 1964, which, in subsequent years, evolved into what was probably the most powerful academic institution on an international scale in regard to research on subcultural group formations and of youth in particular.52 Stewart Hall, his successor at the CCCS, also regarded the sixties as a conjuncture, a time of consolidation that had generated new sensemaking and possibilities for interpretation with its new practices.53 And the French author Claude Dufrasne declared the youth cult of 1966 as the beginning of a new era in an anthology he had edited entitled Des millions de jeunes. As the main argument

of year-specific books, however, strategic considerations in regard to the book market also play a role; they are often written with an upcoming anniversary in mind.

48 Cf. Hecken, Pop, p. 60-76 and esp. 93-151.
51 Halasz, »Great Britain«, p. 32.
for the epochal importance of youth he named the demographic developments: Rising birth rates had created an awareness for the appreciation of the young generation in France as well. In addition, »those guys with long hair and those girls in pants« seemed to be fundamentally different from their age-mates of earlier times. Together, they formed a »new class« that had a completely new relationship to sexuality, consumerism and culture.54

By now, these new juvenile practices and contents also had great influence on adult culture. The goods developed especially for young people no longer just included medial and cultural products sensu stricto but also traditional (and more expensive) consumer goods. One success story, for example, was the Peugeot 204 in a coupé version (without back seats but with a soft top) that was created as a play car for young people in 1967.55 Likewise, the far more expensive Ford Mustang, which had been targeted at well-funded US-American teenagers three years earlier – and that Serge Gainsbourg dedicated a song to – was incredibly popular, however mainly in men between the ages of 45 and 55.56

To the same extent to which the topic of youth was taking up space in the media, on the commodity market and in politics, a countermovement was formed in the middle of the 1960s that saw a new paradigm in the affirmative contributions in which the formerly marginalised youth increasingly appeared as a hegemonial group. The central concept of this countermovement became the keyword »youth cult«, which was used to criticise the fact that one age group had risen to the status of a quasi-religious fetish and that other societal groups were dismissed out of hand at the same time. While statisticians boldly recorded that teenagers had bought 42 percent of all sold records in 1961, one behavioural scientist complained eight years later that the youth completely dominated the market of pop music and had even advanced into the magazines and newspapers made by adults which created a »strange mixture of confusion, mockery and jealousy«, if not a specific »myth of the teenager«.57 Statements like these were ruled by fear of the rise of marginalised groups together with their cultural topics and practices. Still, as early as 1966 a »mainstream of minorities« as it was going to be diagnosed in the following decades started to become apparent.58

55 Andre Franquin Jidéhem et al., Les Chroniques des starter. 60 Populaires de starter, Paris 2012, p. 85.